This article determines the optimal standard of proof in criminal law in a trade-off between three costs: the injustice cost of wrong convictions, the injustice cost of wrong acquittals, and the cost to society of the criminal act itself. The standard of proof affects the level of crime through its impact on deterrence. The article applies the expresssion for the optimal standard to the crime of sexual violation against women. While the result must be interpreted with caution, the analysis indicates that for this crime the concern for prevention may have a significant effect on the optimal standard of proof. (JEL K14, K40, K42).
INTRODUCTION
The level of certainty required for a criminal conviction-the standard of proof in criminal law-determines the number of innocently convicted and falsely acquitted defendants, and it is sometimes argued that the standard should be set so as to balance these two numbers. This leads to a simple theory of the optimal standard: If society considers the conviction of one innocent person to be as 'costly' as the acquittal of exactly 99 offenders, it should require a 99% probability of guilt, while if the ratio of injustice costs is 1:9, it should require a threshold probability of 90%, and so on.
should suffice for conviction. In particular, they analyze whether character evidence should be allowed in a criminal trial, and show that allowing character evidence may, under certain circumstances, have a detrimental effect on deterrence of crime, since it may provide criminals who have committed crime in the past too little incentive to abandon their criminal career.
Farmer and Terrell analyze the following choice involving justice and prevention of crime: when the propensity for crime is higher for one (race or gender) group than for another, allowing members of the former group to be convicted on relatively less evidence will lead to more incapacitation at a given cost in terms of unfair conviction, but will violate the principle of equality before the law. There is hence a trade-off between justice and prevention of crime, and they explore the likely significance of this trade-off through simulations of a simple model. According to their simulations, adhering to the principle of equality before the law may be costly in terms of less incapacitation and hence more crime.
Three papers by, respectively, Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987) , Miceli (1990) and Yilankaya (2002) are worth mentioning because they address an issue that will not be included in the present analysis but which may be important when setting the standard of proof. The three papers analyze the effect of the standard of proof and of the size of the sanction on both the prosecutor's effort to establish guilt and the defendant's effort to establish innocence. Thus, Rubinfeld and Sappington investigate how the standard of proof and the size of the sanction affect the defendant's effort to signal innocence, Miceli analyzes how the two variables affect prosecutorial effort, and Yilankaya explores how the two variables affect both the defendant's and the prosecutor's efforts, which are seen as strategically interdependent. In contrast, the present paper abstracts from ('black-boxes') this and other interactions of the standard of proof with the judicial process. 4 The question analyzed in this paper is what level of certainty society should optimally strive for, and this can be analyzed without going into the process through which this level of certainty is attained.
Another article by Miceli (1991) should also be mentioned, although it is not mainly concerned with the standard of proof. He analyzes how much effort the legal system should spend to investigate some given crime and how high the sanction for the crime should be, as choices involving trade-offs between justice (fairness) and efficiency.
Andreoni (1991) argues that higher sanctions may not lead to less crime, since jurors may adjust the standard of proof to the level of sanctions in order not to risk sanctioning an innocent person harshly. Andreoni hence points to a possible conflict of interest between jurors and the rest of society; jurors must live with the thought of perhaps having been directly responsible for sanctioning an innocent person, and may therefore have an incentive to apply a higher standard of proof than that which is in society's overall interest. This and other agency issues will, however, not be addressed in the present paper, since the main aim of this paper is to establish the socially optimal standard of proof as a benchmark. Demougin and Fluet (2005) discuss what they view as a difference between common law and civil law standards of proof in civil disputes. They argue, consistent with the present analysis, that the preponderance of evidence standard associated with the common law is more directed at achieving deterrence than the higher standard which they associate with continental legal systems, which they view as putting greater emphasis on avoiding error.
Other law and economics references on the standard of proof in criminal law are Kaplow (1994) , Posner (1999) , Reinganum (1988) , Sanchirico (2001) , Kaplow and Shavell (1994) , and Polinsky and Shavell (1989) .
THE MODEL
The analysis concerns one particular kind of criminal act. Each such act causes harm, h, to society, and is assumed to be undertaken by one person alone. Potential criminals are assumed risk neutral, and, following the Becker (1968) approach to crime, each will commit the crime if the benefit, v, is greater than the expected sanction.
5 There are assumed to be N people in the population, and the fraction of the population with benefit v is given by the density function z v  0, and the cumulative distribution function Zv, both defined on the interval 0; . For analytical convenience, these functions will be assumed differentiable.
When the criminal act has been committed, somebody will report it to the police, who in turn will undertake an investigation and take the case to court if there is sufficient evidence against the prime suspect. 6 The evidence generated through investigations and court proceedings will be stochastic and may be more or less incriminating. It will be assumed that the judge/juror can rank the evidence in this respect, and that the ranking can be expressed by a continuous variable x ∈ 0, , where the number is higher the more conclusive the evidence. Furthermore, it will be assumed that when the issue arises whether to sanction and by how much, this choice concerns only one individual, termed the prime suspect. The implicit assumption here is that criminal sanctions only apply when the (subjective) probability of guilt is above 1 2 , which cannot be the case for more than one suspect of a given crime given the assumption that only one individual commits each crime.
Note the assumption that uncertainty concerns the identity of the offender rather than the nature of the act commited by a known (potential) offender. This implies that wrongful conviction will not in itself affect deterrence. Thus, if Smith decides not to steal Jones's car, Smith need generally not fear being falsely convicted of having stolen Jones's car for the simple reason that it has not been stolen. Naturally, Smith may fear being innocently convicted for another theft or another crime, but this risk exists whether or not he steals Jones' car. For further discussion of this point, see Lando (2006) .
Two events are central: that there is evidence of weight x against either the guilty, i.e the event g ∩ x, or against an innocent, i.e. the event i ∩ x. The probabilities of these joint events will be denoted f g x and f i x, respectively with corresponding cumulative distribution functions F g x and F i x. This implies that the probability of a wrongful acquittal equals F g   x, whereas the probability of wrongful conviction equals 1 . In Appendix 1, the joint density functions f g x and f i x are derived from conditional probabilities. It is there shown that when we assume that someone will commit the crime, the joint probability that x comes forth against some individual and the individual is guilty, i.e. f g x, equals the conditional probability that the evidence x comes forth against a given individual who commits the crime. This means that we can use f g x also as a conditional probability below.
If the sanction is s and the level of utility for which a person will be exactly deterred is
v is then the law-abiding part of the population and 1 − Z  v is the criminal part. The density function f g x is here the conditional probability that the evidence x comes forth against an individual when that individual chooses to commit the crime.
It is worth noting that the size of the sanction is exogenously given. One may suggest increasing the sanction instead of lowering the standard of proof in order to increase deterrence, but when wrongful conviction is possible and sanctioning is costly, it may well be optimal to limit the size of the sanction. Thus, it is a well-known argument against very harsh penalties, such as the death penalty, that wrongful conviction can occur. Moreover, when the elasticity of crime with respect to the sanction is much lower than −1, as the empirical evidence suggests to be the case, society's sanctioning costs will increase in the size of the sanction. For these reasons, it would be possible to derive an optimal size of the sanction within the present model; 7 instead, it will be assumed that the sanction is set optimally at some finite level (and that the optimal sanction is not so high as to deter all crime).
I will incorporate justice concerns into the social welfare function in the same way as Diamond (2002), Miceli (1991) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) . When a crime has been committed, not sanctioning the guilty comes at a social cost Q in terms of 'justice disutility,' as compared with the situation where the offender is caught and sanctioned. The social justice cost from not sanctioning the guilty will hence be 1 − Z  vF g   xQ. The injustice cost incurred by society when a person is innocently convicted will be denoted . The expected cost associated with unfair convictions is hence
Let c denote the cost to society of applying the sanction, i.e. the cost of incarceration. It will be applied both when the innocent and when the guilty are sanctioned. The total expected sanctioning costs are then:
Several difficult issues arise when fairness is included as part of social welfare. One issue is whether the utility derived by the offender should be included in social welfare or whether it should be considered 'socially illicit.' A related issue is whether the offender's disutility of being sanctioned should be included as a part of social cost. It may be held that when a person is wrongly convicted, the cost of incarceration is included in , and that the disutility to the guilty person of being incarcerated is included in (or in some cases even constitutes the source of) Q. This paper will analyze which standard of proof maximizes the preferences of the average (non-criminal) citizen, i.e. which standard would be chosen in a democratic vote. As a result, the offender's utility from committing the criminal act will not be included in social welfare, and the cost to the convicted (and to the family of the convicted) will be assumed to be included in  and Q. Alternatively, the cost to the convicted can be included in the cost to society of sanctioning. It will be investigated below how sensitive results are to the cost of sanctioning.
Social welfare is maximized when total social costs SC are minimized with respect to  x. SC can be written:
THE OPTIMAL STANDARD OF PROOF
The optimal standard of proof can be found by inserting the expression for  v into the social cost function and differentiating with respect to  x. It is convenient first to express social costs as
v is the number of crimes, and where h  w is the total harm per crime, including not only the direct harm, h, but also the injustice and sanctioning cost per crime, w. w is given by:
where F g   x Q is the expected injustice cost per crime associated with the offender escaping sanction, 1 − F i   x  is the expected injustice cost per crime due to false conviction, and c 1 −
is the expected sanctioning cost per crime.
We can simplify the derivative of social cost with respect to the standard of proof by noting that
 v, and that therefore
In this expression
, and: 
which proves the following proposition:
Two comments should be made. First, note that in the absence of a deterrent effect, i.e. if z  v  0, the result is
This condition−mentioned in the introduction−equates the marginal relative number of falsely acquitted and falsely convicted with their relative costs. It should be stressed that the condition is marginal. Thus, if e.g. probg |  x *  equals 90%, this does not mean that one in every ten verdicts will be an unjust conviction. Rather, it means that whenever the evidence is at the critical level, the defendant is innocent with a probability of 10%. A majority of defendants will be found guilty at a higher level of certainty. 8 Second, note that the extent to which the optimal standard is affected by the concern for prevention of crime depends on two factors: how harmful the crime is (h  w), where harm includes the expected injustice and sanctioning cost per committed crime, and how large a fraction of the criminal population will be deterred by a lowering of the standard (s).
Third, a higher c increases the optimal standard of proof when realistic assumptions are made concerning the deterrent effect; however when c is large, there is a greater effect on the standard of proof of including the concern for deterrence, since c enters through w.
AN APPLICATION TO SEXUAL VIOLATION AGAINST WOMEN
Trials of alleged sexual violation must often be decided by the court on the basis of evidence that leaves room for doubt.
To insert into the formula:
we need estimates for , Q, h, c, w, s and . In the following, the numbers apply to Denmark, but it should be obvious that a similar analysis can be carried out for any other jurisdiction.
One variable can be chosen freely, let us set Q  1.
To establish the social welfare function, I conducted a survey among a group of graduate students and faculty at Copenhagen Business School, whom I asked for their preferences concerning the ratios of /Q and /h.
The exact wording of the survey is in the Appendix 2. Below, figure 1 and figure 2 present the answers to the two questions, respectively: Note that women attach a higher cost both to false acquittals and to the crime, relative to the cost of a false conviction, than do men, as one might perhaps expect. Society's preferences will be taken to be equal to the median answer in the total population. In the group of 49 respondents, the median preference for /Q was a ratio of 10:1, while the median ratio for /h was 5:1.
9
The respondents were not asked to take into account the cost, c, to society of applying the sanction, and presumably did not do so. The average sanction is a year and a half and the offender is released after serving 2/3 of the time, so the effective average sanction is one year. The cost, c, has been estimated at $35, 000 per year and the question is what this amounts to in terms of utility. It may be compared with the value of avoiding one violation which in utility terms has been set at 2 (by the fact that Q  1, /Q  10 and /h  5). The monetary value of avoiding one violation is of course controversial; if we assume it is in the interval between $200, 000 and $300, 000, 10 then, since the utility 2 equals between $200, 000 and $300, 000, the amount of $35, 000 is roughly in the interval between 1/6 and 1/9. Since it will not be very important to our results where in the interval it lies, this will not be pursued any further.
In the expression for w:
, dominates the others. This is due to the fact that only 60 of 1000 criminal acts lead to conviction. Since 940 of 1000 offenders are not sanctioned, the expected injustice cost of wrong acquittals is 940 1000
The variable s is the level of the sanction in terms of disutility. As noted, it is approximately one years' imprisonment.
11 The disutility of this sanction to the criminal is difficult to estimate. Given that h ≃ 2, let us assume as a very rough approximation that s  1/2, meaning that one year in prison corresponds to 1/4 the utility loss of a violation. This utility loss should be understood to include social sanctions following a guilty verdict. Still, the number may be controversial; the reader can explore alternative assumptions.  2800, and  then equals 2800/1000  2.8. Given these assumptions, and assuming that the cost of sanctioning is 1/6, the optimal standard of proof becomes:
In comparison, the optimal standard becomes:
in the absence of a preventive effect, if the cost of sanctioning is 1/6. To see what is behind the result that .67 is the optimal standard when the preventive effect is included, consider the consequences of lowering the standard of proof from 75% to 65%. If, say, 100 offenders are convicted at 75% certainty, 15 and 10 more defendants are convicted when the standard is lowered (this number is irrelevant since all effects are scaled up or down) to 65%, of these approximately 7 will be guilty while 3 will be innocent, assuming that defendants' probabilities of guilt are uniformly distributed on the interval from 75% to 65%. The added cost in terms of unfair convictions is then 10 acquittals is 7  1 − 1 6 . From a justice viewpoint, costs exceed benefits by approximately 24-25 utils. However, the increase in the expected sanction will be approximately 10/100  10%, so violations will decrease by 1 − 1.1 −0.1  .9% which amounts to 9 fewer violations. This adds 27 in utility (h  w  3). Given our assumptions, marginal benefits are higher than marginal costs when prevention is taken into account; this reflects that the standard is too high at 75%.
Applying the proposition of this paper to the case of sexual violation hence leads to the suggestion that the standard of proof may fall below 75% certainty, i.e below the level which is sometimes associated with 'clear and convincing evidence' (see e.g. Schauer and Zeckhauser, 1996) , when prevention of crime is taken into account. It goes without saying that this conclusion should be viewed as tentative and that for a firm conclusion to be drawn, a good deal more work is needed, not least in the process of eliciting reliable measures of preferences. For example, the sample is limited, both in size and in its representativeness, and it is also not clear to which extent the preferences elicited generalize to other types of crime. The main point here is to demonstrate the possibility of setting an optimal standard of proof from basic parameters; with the framework suggested, differences of opinion concerning the optimal standard of proof can be traced back to different estimates of one or more parameters.
DISCUSSION
This section discusses some general issues and some objections that may be raised against the theory and the application.
A basic issue is the choice of social welfare function. It was assumed in this paper that when people express a strong preference for not sanctioning the innocent, this may be taken at face value as expressing a strong preference for avoiding an unjust outcome. Against this view, it has been argued that people are more concerned with the risk that they themselves will be wrongly convicted than with justice for others, and that the analysis can therefore be framed exclusively in terms of efficiency, narrowly defined. However, it may be replied that the view that people are only concerned about their own risk of false conviction is not confirmed by the survey. Both men and women report strong preferences for not sanctioning the innocent, and women's concern is hard to reconcile with the view that they are simply risk averse, since women need not fear being falsely convicted for sexual violation.
The theory presented in this paper can also be criticized on the basis that it is morally wrong for society to (purposely) risk convicting an innocent person in order to avoid crime, i.e. in order to avoid that some other person commits a wrong. 16 However, stated in this way the criticism is too strong, for if it is generally wrong to risk convicting an innocent person, then the very existence of a legal system must also be wrong, for we know that any legal system will inevitably make mistakes.
17
In a similar vein, it may be held that for ethical reasons, society should rather change other policy variables, e.g. increase the level of police effort, the size of sanctions, or establish social programs that help potential offenders, rather than to compromise on the fundamental value of 'legal security.' However, as already mentioned for the case of the sanction, it can be replied that crime will persist also when all of these other variables are set at their optimal level, and that the expression for the optimal standard derived in this paper can be understood as taking these variables as given at their optimal level.
Some will argue that there is unlikely to be a deterrent effect of lowering the standard of proof, since most individuals who contemplate committing crime do not know how the legal system operates and may not even think of the likelihood of being convicted if apprehended. However, many follow court cases in the media and repeat offenders do become acquainted with the legal system. Also, there is the effect on incapacitation, as well as the effect on efforts by the police, which can be influenced by the prospect of being able to convict a suspect.
Concerning the application to sexual violation, it may be objected that this crime falls into the category for which the risk of unfair conviction does affect the incentive for committing the crime, and that the crime therefore cannot be used as an application of the model. Arguably, a man who has chosen not to commit a particular act of sexual violation may nevertheless be falsely accused of it. However, there is reason to be skeptical of the idea that the risk of unfair conviction will significantly affect incentives for committing sexual violation. For this to be a factor, a man considering committing rape must think that if he abstains, he may still be accused of it. But in the case where a person considers committing rape and abstains from doing so, abstaining is most likely to mean that there is no intercourse, 18 and in the absence of intercourse it is unlikely that the man will be convicted of rape. Thus, it seems unlikely that false accusations increase incentives for committing sexual violation to any significant extent.
19
The question may be raised what quantitative expressions for the standard of proof really mean. For example, what does it mean in terms of jury instructions to say that the standard is 67%? This issue cannot be fully dealt with here, except to note that it should not be taken for granted that standards of proof cannot be expressed quantitatively in terms of probabilities of guilt. Experiments have shown that jurors find it difficult to distinguish the different standards of proof and that at least some jurors translate the judge's instruction concerning 'beyond a reasonable doubt' into a required subjective probability of guilt of approximately 75-80% (see Simon, 1970) , which is presumably substantially below the intended level (although in conformity with the optimal level for the crime considered in this article). In an overview of the literature on how jurors make decisions, Saks (1997:sect.6) concludes that: ...'several studies have found that the applicable standard of proof is best comprehended by jurors when it is presented to them in the one way that the courts refuse to use: by way of quantitative metaphors.'
As a somewhat different issue, one may fear that, while quantitative expressions or metaphors may be better grasped by jurors than verbal statements, if a jury is told to apply a given quantified standard, it will do so with error, which will increase the likelihood of innocent conviction. But how the potential for error affects the standard which one would want the jury and the judge to follow cannot be addressed here; these issues are left to future research.
Finally, it may be objected that the survey is unlikely to yield reliable information concerning people's true preferences for justice versus efficiency. As mentioned, it is well-known that answers may depend on the way questions are phrased. This objection is a serious one, and provides reason for caution. It is very difficult to obtain reliable estimates of people's preferences concerning the given trade-offs; the empirical evidence gathered in this article, as well as the conclusions drawn from it, should thus be considered as highly uncertain, and as exploratory rather than final. It may also be objected that several respondents seem not to share the utilitarian logic of this paper. In the first question, 15 of the 49 answers and in the second, 13 of the 49 answers can be interpreted as denying that logic (including both the answer infinite and the answer zero). On the other hand, a strong majority, more than 2/3 of all respondents, were in fact willing to quantify their preferences.
CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the consequences of viewing the standard of proof as determined by justice concerns as well as by the concern for prevention of crime. It has demonstrated that the optimal standard can be derived from two properties of the social welfare function together with an estimate of the elasticity of the number of crimes with respect to the expected sanction. The two properties are: the marginal rate of substitution between a false conviction and a false acquittal, and the marginal rate of substitution between a false conviction and a criminal act. Thus, for any crime, given an estimate of the size of the preventive effect, the optimal standard can be derived from the answer to two questions: 'how many offenders is society willing to let go to avoid sanctioning one person who is innocent?,' and 'how many criminal acts is society willing to accept to avoid one person being innocently convicted?' In the paper, the social welfare function was derived from median responses to the two questions among a group of 50 people (mainly graduate students), for the crime of sexual violation. To repeat, the result must be interpreted with caution, as much remains to be done to accurately estimate the preferences, and since we have only little information about how the standard of proof affects the level of crime. However, the present study suggests that for the crime of sexual violation the aim of preventing crime may have a significant effect on the socially desirable standard of proof.
Appendix 1
The joint probabilities f g x and f i x will be derived from conditional probabilities from the ex ante viewpoint of the judge or the jury, assuming they do not possess any information to distinguish the agents. Also, the probabilities will be calculated per crime committed, which means we can assume that one and only one crime will be committed. Thus, denote by h g x the conditional probability that when any given individual commits the crime, x will come forth against that individual, and by h i x the probability that when one given individual commits the crime, x will come forth against another given individual. The probability that any given individual commits the crime is 1 N , so the probability that x will come forth against any given individual equals h g x 1 N .Since this same probability applies to all N individuals , the probability that some individual will have evidence x against him or her and be guilty equals Nh g x 1 N  h g x. Hence, when we assume that someone will commit the crime and only one crime will be committed, the joint probability that x comes forth against some individual and the individual is guilty equals the conditional probability that the evidence x comes forth against a given individual who commits the crime, i.e. f g x  h g x. Similarly, the probability that some individual will have evidence of weight x levied falsely against him or her can be calculated as follows: The probability that any given individual commits the crime is 1 N , and the probability that any other given individual will be charged with the evidence x therefore equals h i x 1 N . There are N − 1 indviduals who may be falsely accused and N individuals who may commit the crime, so the probability of someone being falsely accused is h i x 1 N N − 1 N  N − 1h i x.This is the f i x function in the text. Note that this expression does not increase with the size of the population as it may appear, since h i x is decreasing with the size of the population.
Appendix 2
The Survey Dear Colleague/Student, I am writing to request your participation in a short questionnaire. All participants will remain anonymous. The answers will be used in an article I am writing on the burden of proof in criminal law. The issue to be looked at in the article deals with the degree of certainty required before a man is convicted of sexual violation.
In the first question, please ignore the fact that the punishment can act as a deterrent. Instead, focus exclusively on your sense of justice. There are, however, two things to consider in contrast to one another. On the one hand, with regard to justice, it is important to avoid convicting someone who is innocent, while on the other hand it can seem unjust (also for the victim) if someone who is guilty is not convicted. If high demands are made on the strength of the evidence, fewer innocent people will be convicted while more guilty people will go free. Fewer innocent people will be convicted while more guilty people will go free, the stronger the evidence required.
Question 1) How many guilty people are you willing to let go free in order to avoid someone being wrongly convicted of sexual violation against women? a) 1 b) 5 c) 10 d) 20 e) 100 f) 1000 g) an infinite number, impossible to compensate h) other, please specify the amount
In the second question, please take into consideration that the punishment can act as a deterrent. Please assume that fewer innocent people will be convicted, but that more people will be in danger of being violated because the deterrent effect will be small/will not be as great. There is no logical connection between this and the above question, which means that one can give any answer whatsoever without contradicting one's self.
Question 2) How many sexual violations can you/are you willing to accept in order to avoid someone being wrongly convicted of sexual violation against women? a) 1 b) 5 c) 10 d) 20 e) 100 f) 1000 g) an infinite number, impossible to compensate h) other, please specify the amount.
Please indicate whether you are male or female.
Endnotes * I wish to thank two anonymous referees for very useful comments. I am responsible, of course, for any remaining errors. 1. This can be seen from the following example. Consider the situation where 90% certainty is just sufficient for conviction, where the ratio of costs is 9:1, and where ten cases that involve exactly 90% certainty should be decided. In expected terms, in nine of these cases, the verdict will be a correct conviction, whereas in one case, an innocent person will be convicted. Hence, if the standard of proof were lowered slightly, nine correct convictions would be turned into wrong acquittals, while one wrong conviction would be turned into a correct acquittal. By assumption, the benefit and the cost outweigh each other, which shows that the usual marginality condition is fulfilled at 90% certainty, and that it is hence the optimal standard. 2. Note that this analysis remains relevant after the invention of the DNA method. Such evidence has, for example, nothing to say on the question of intent.
Prevention and the Optimal Standard of Proof / 49 DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1237 16. This moral dilemma is mentioned also by Miceli (1991:6) who gives references to discussions by Nozick and Elster. 17. So the point needs to be put in terms of degree: it can more reasonably be argued that there is a limit to the degree to which society can in a utilitarian fashion sacrifice the interests of possibly innocent defendants in order to benefit other members of society. This cannot be entered further into here. 18. When in doubt about whether the woman means it when she says no, a lower standard of proof is likely, in so far as it has an effect, to induce the man not to have intercourse.
19. Although it may be argued, theoretically, that the incentive to achieve consent will be lower when consent does not preclude conviction.
